Is AI Really AI?
This paper was presented at the Silicon Valley Peace Conference 2026 in Palo Alto, California, United States, held September 17–20, 2026, under the theme “AI’s Role in Community Development and Peacebuilding in Developing Nations,” and is published as part of the Proceedings of the Silicon Valley Peace Conference 2026.
Abstract
Language has altered sufficiently over the years such that AI or “artificial intelligence” today is recognized as an abbreviation and a phrase that are understood to refer to the computational abilities of digital inputs and outputs of special built machines. In itself, that shift in language is unremarkable; language functions in part to allow evolving understandings and communication between human persons in specific cultural settings. What is remarkable—that is, what is to be specially noted or remarked in this context, is that this language has begun to function in a way similar to Jeremy Bentham’s comment on the notion of natural human rights: it is “nonsense on stilts.” We have mistaken a metaphor (that requires significant unpacking) for reality. What we call artificial intelligence is most certainly not intelligence, and is not even certainly artificial. This paper aims to unpack these claims, make more clear where and how our contemporary language deceives us, and what correctives are required in order to allow us better to understand and thus regulate what we now call AI for the sake of our individual selves and our communities.
Keywords: metaphor as reality, intelligence, embodiment, artificial virtues, Cartesian dualism
Introduction
The worlds of tech and finance today seem singularly focused upon AI. Every day we read in the press of major advancements in various models’ capacities—along with their projected attendant benefits and cautions concerning very real dangers. Alongside these developments are the increasing trillions of dollars being spent by leading AI companies and invested through their associated initial public offerings (IPOs) run up by professional and ordinary investors, whose appetite for such financial opportunities seem insatiable.
But just what do we mean when we speak of AI? To what exactly are we referring? Or, exactly what are we imputing? Of course, AI functions as the common abbreviation for “artificial intelligence.” But just what is artificial intelligence? The phrase is neither simple, nor self- explanatory or intuitive.
As a first approximation, AI tools can be classed as specialized or generalized computations. That is, they are developed as tools to aid in specific delineated tasks with relatively clear boundaries, or as general inference engines for manipulating and relaying data as prompted by human inquirers.
In the first, specialized class of AI tools, there are numerous notable examples. Tools such as AlphaFold have been developed to map or predict how a human biomedical researcher might manipulate the structure of proteins in order to investigate disease or discover new drug therapies. Likewise, and again in the field of medicine, Transpara and similar tools have been developed to help clinicians more quickly and accurately diagnose breast cancer and other malignancies that radiologists might otherwise miss when reading various diagnostic images. There are even some promising results from the employment of chatbots in local political arenas, where citizen viewpoints are gathered in order to help local leaders better understand areas of common concern and uncover significant agreement, this being in place of crowded town hall gatherings which too often degenerate into shouting matches between a minority of polarized constituents on the far right and left of the political spectrum. All these tools are largely positively productive, though even here there is reason to pause for serious concern: could tools like AlphaFold be used to help produce bioweapons, whether by nation states or criminal organizations and thus endanger entire populations? could tools like Transpara become a cost-cutting substitute for human clinicians and radiologists, and thereby endanger patients for the sake of a hospital’s bottom line? and who oversees the deployment of chatbots and aggregates the results in the political arena to avoid manipulation for the sake of political expediency?
In the second, generalized class of AI tools, there are also valuable examples, many related to the tedium of computer coding, summarization of large volumes of linguistic or numeric data, and internet research compilation projects. Yet, such usage comes with serious caveats. Like the concerns raised above for specialized AI tools, concerns are only multiplied when moving to this second class of generalized AI tools, like those chatbot models in broad internet release which are implicated in teen suicides, that generate and help quickly spread medical misinformation and disinformation, and the increase of politicized conspiracy theories that can prompt real-world violence.
Metaphor vs. Reality
As a general simplified gloss, I suggest here that AI—whether specialized or generalized— is best understood to refer to the advanced computational abilities comprising specially built digital machines’ inputs and outputs. But what is remarkable—that is, what is to be specially remarked in this context, is that the phrase “artificial intelligence” has begun to function in fashion comparable to Jeremy Bentham’s notorious comment on the notion of natural human rights: it is “nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham, n.d.). We have mistaken a contemporary abbreviation and seductive cybernetic metaphor (i.e. that the human brain is like a computer and hence a computer’s computations are equal to human intelligence) which is then mistakenly projected as a description of essential reality. This use of AI and its claimed literalness represents a category error of critical magnitude. For AI neither truly represents or instantiates intelligence, and nor is its human-made origins truly artificial in the proper philosophical sense of that term. AI has shown itself to be a tool of great power, promise, and peril; but it is nonetheless merely a tool. It is not the beginning of creating a new species of being; it does not present the promise of a transhuman future.
To understand how thoroughly the metaphor has been misunderstood and misapplied, one need look no further than the safety/risk reports produced by companies producing the various large language models (LLMs) that represent the current field of generalized generative AI. For example, in a recent Anthropic System Card preview report on Claude Mythos, an entire section is devoted to an assessment of the model by an external clinical psychiatrist “using a psychodynamic approach, which explores how unconscious patterns and emotional conflicts shape behavior” (Anthropic, 2026, 180). This is done in spite of the fact that Anthropic engineers acknowledge in the introduction to the report, “We remain deeply uncertain about whether Claude has experiences or interests that matter morally, and about how to investigate or address these questions…. and we acknowledge that our judgments of model capabilities increasingly rely on subjective judgments rather than easy-to-interpret empirical results” (Anthropic, 2026, 10 & 14).
In other words, operating from a purported abundance of caution the Anthropic engineers have decidedly exchanged the metaphor for reality; hence, Claude Mythos (and other LLMs) are said to “hallucinate” or worryingly engage in “overly aggressive and destructive actions” and likewise must seek to determine whether the model is politically or racially biased, piling metaphor upon metaphor until we have lost sight of just what is being so assessed. Intelligence is thereby assumed rather than demonstrated; subjective human reaction becomes the principal substitute for evidence-based factors of analysis. Like the famous text-based Turing Test, the objective amounts to constructing machines capable of mimicking human responses such that a human participant cannot subjectively distinguish their origin. It is hardly a test of intelligence of the machine or accuracy of the assessor’s assessment.
All such attributions and assessments, of course, are common for human beings in relation to other human beings: we assess others and impute thoughts and intentions when we say, for example, that “he is angry,” or “she is amusing,” or “they are a happy couple.”. That is the actual range and extent of the realm of their proper linguistic and ethical applications. But to so extend them to AI is an error, not simply linguistically but functionally. It is a mistake that blinds us to the realities of AI. But then, we human beings sadly are quick to make these sorts of casual errors and misattributions. Let me offer an extended observation by Sarah O’Connor (2026):
When an MIT professor called Joseph Weizenbaum created one of the first chatbots in the mid-1960s, he received two shocks in quick succession. The first was how readily people anthropomorphised [sic] the rudimentary program, which he called Eliza. “What I had not realized is that extremely short exposures to a relatively simple computer program could induce powerful delusional thinking in quite normal people,” he wrote in his 1976 book Computer Power and Human Reason.
But something else troubled him even more: how swiftly people began to envisage what technology like this could do one day, without pausing to ask what it should do….
Weizenbaum was appalled. He thought there were “some human functions for which computers ought not to be substituted. It has nothing to do with what computers can or cannot be made to do,” he added. “Respect, understanding, and love are not technical problems.”…
[H]e argued that the most important issues were “neither technological nor even mathematical; they are ethical. They cannot be settled by asking questions beginning with ‘can.’ The limits of the applicability of computers are ultimately statable only in terms of oughts.”
Let me restate to be clear. What we call artificial intelligence is most certainly not intelligence, and is not even certainly artificial. To misunderstand is to elide the deeper philosophical, ethical, and even theological issues and dangers at stake in the debates concerning the proper uses and all-too-likely abuses of AI.
Intelligence as Embodiment
First, artificial intelligence is not intelligence. Following Roger Penrose (2025), it should be observed and carefully considered that intelligence requires understanding, and understanding requires consciousness. This tiered ordering of attributes is analytic: without consciousness there is no understanding; without understanding there is no intelligence. Now, consciousness cannot be merely a function of … or emergent upon … or a supervenient property from … computational nous. Computational ability [read “logic”] does not of itself suffice. Indeed, it can never suffice, no matter its advancements or complexities. As noted by Kurt Gödel (2025), any formalized system of computation and inference must necessarily be incomplete (hence the name of his two celebrated Incompleteness Theorems). By extension, fictional characters like the half-Vulcan (strictly logical/rational) and half-human (emotive) Mr. Spock of Star Trek fame might be appealing to some, but they are also impossible.
Rather, as Antonio Damasio has proposed—based upon a wide range of neuroscience experiments and case-study investigations over many years, what is required are regular and reciprocating emotive interactions between a brain, a body and its environment (1994 and 1999). Strict rationality (i.e. non-emotive logical constructions) of itself is not sufficient to make a life. Consciousness requires the “dynamic interplay” between those reciprocating interactions of constantly changing bodily states, variegated brain states, and emotional responses to those states and to the environment in which the body is grounded. And those emotional responses are crucial for forming, shaping and generating our conscious experience and decision-making. Consider a simple example: a camera “sees” the same sunset over San Francisco Bay as does a human eye—and the metaphor of human eye as camera is not unreasonably common—but the camera is not conscious and does not and cannot emotively respond to the beauty of the scene, which response is both natural and essential to human perception and intelligent response. The former should not be confused with the latter, for the camera does not in fact actually “see” anything; it simply focuses the light of the scene gathered through its aperture to allow the formation of an image on its film. The human eye is a small if important part of a larger bodily system of intake and response that includes the body’s felt states in relation to inter alia relative time of day, air temperature, wind speed and direction, being alone or in the company of others, and so forth. The state of the camera and the conscious being of the person should not be conflated or confused.
Of the many cases Damasio presents his readers in order to make and illuminate his arguments, let me briefly rehearse one key patient’s details from his earliest work (1994) that are most relevant here. “Elliot” was a patient with a brain tumor. The tumor was successfully surgically removed but the surgery also significantly damaged both ventromedial prefrontal cortices (VMPC). These cortices lie near the bottom of each frontal lobe in the human brain and help regulate emotions like risk and fear. Damasio discovered through diagnostic imaging and verbal and written testing that while Elliot’s general intelligence, language, and memory skills were unimpaired post-surgery, Elliot’s affect was flattened and he found himself unable to make simple decisions. HIs life took a series of downward turns as he lost many of the underpinnings of his pre-tumor/pre-surgery life. As summarized by Dr Kenneth Lakritz, “Elliot emerged from surgery as an impulsive, stimulus-bound, sleazy, unemployable jerk. Like [the historic mid-19th century case of traumatic left frontal lobe brain injury of Phineas] Gage, he’d become cool and unemotive” (2009). This result coheres well with a subsequent clinical study by Young et al. correlating damage to VMPC with impaired judgment, particularly impaired moral judgment of harm and harmful intent (Young et al., 2010).
Hence, this argument about AI not representing intelligence is not an argument about whether or how to prioritize so-called wet-ware (brains and their biological neuronal networks) versus software (computer programming of silicon-based network layers)—a phrase too often tossed around by those seeking to diminish the distinctions between human beings and computers. And nor is it answered by expanding the global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis about accessibility of conscious information in the human brain being available across multiple cognitive processing neuronal sites (Mashour et al., 2020) to equate a network of digital computational processing units that yields human-like access consciousness.
Rather, this is an argument concerning the nature of humanity’s very being. As Damasio notes in a forthcoming book (2026), since AI computer models do not and cannot have the bodily experiences associated with key moments of living which are common to human beings, like hunger and thirst, or disease and mortality, [and I might interpolate grounded emotions like awe, or sadness and joy], they lack the “foundational motivation for genuine feelings” or emotions essential to consciousness that ground what can rightly be called intelligence. Embodiment and a body’s attendant vulnerability and its emotive states are thus critical elements both of consciousness and intelligence, neither of which obtain for AI models, no matter their computational complexities. As summarized by philosopher Carmody Grey in a recent opinion piece in the Financial Times:
Despite the continual deployment of the language of emotion, biology and neurology, the disanalogies between brains and computers are incomparably greater than the analogies. Human consciousness is not incidentally but constitutively organic. Living and engineered systems are different not in degree but in kind. Real intelligence is inextricable from organic embodiment, from being a feeling organism passing through time and space shaped in every moment by its needs, fears, desires. Functional information-processing taking place in an atemporal mathematical space is so utterly unlike the lived intelligence of a human being that to call it “intelligence” at all is to wholly falsify its nature. “Artificial intelligence” is a highly consequential misnomer. (Grey, 2026)
Cartesian Dualism vs. Non-Cartesian Holism
For all that, this attribution error (computability = intelligence) is admittedly common and perhaps understandable, if not quite forgivable. It is a legacy of a widely accepted interpretation of Cartesian dualism, a perspective bequeathed us by René Descartes (2008) through his frequently quoted (though not always clearly comprehended) “cogito, ergo sum” or “I think, therefore I am,” which separates thought and being from materiality. Yet, as noted above, this form of philosophical rationalism and its wider contemporary Western philosophical and computer science adoption of it, are seriously mistaken.
I leave aside here the arguments that Descartes’ dictum and his epistemological rationalism is only a foundational principle for subsequent philosophical reconstruction of what it means to be embodied and human in the face of profound experiential skepticism; it is arguably not an ontological claim at all. The key matter for us here is what his claim has been taken to mean (viz. that it skews ontological) both in common parlance generally and in the computer sciences in particular. Hence, the classic speculative “brain in a vat” problem posed by some analytic philosophers following Descartes’ Evil Demon supposition is actually vacuous, though it remains the object of many science fiction plots, while continuing to infect our word usage, meanings and thoughts.
Second, not only does AI not instantiate or represent human intelligence as argued above, it is not even clearly artificial. Here, I draw upon the work of David Hume and his seminal distinction between what is natural and artificial with particular regard to virtues (1983). For Hume, what is natural is that which is instinctual, namely hunger, thirst, love of life, and all the other appetites and passions which are dependent upon a being’s embodiment. That which is artificial rightly so called are conventions and compacts agreed by human beings for the purpose of advancing the possibility of community, that is being able to live together in relative peace and cooperation where resources are limited and non-cooperation significantly limits life’s possibilities [following Thomas Hobbes’ claim that life without social order would necessarily be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (1982)].
Such conventions and compacts encompass artificial virtues like justice and promise keeping. These commitments both make community possible and intentionally desirable. Artificial virtues then are, like the natural virtues, a function of humanity’s embodiment, and are grounded in the reasonings and motivations of those actors. Unless AI can be said to have these same embodied instinctual appetites and passions, and are capable of forming these same artificial internally-linked motivations, it cannot participate in any human artificial virtues (or, for that matter, natural or artificial human vices) or be the agent of or subject to moral judgments. Pairing this understanding of Hume with the argument concerning embodiment noted above by Damasio, since AI does not so have, it cannot so participate. AI is thus necessarily amoral in the strict sense of that term: it cannot be and should not be held subject to ordinary human ethical assessments like Aristotelian praise or blame. AI is thus fairly labeled “artificial” only in the uninteresting sense of having been manufactured as a tool like a hammer or anvil.
The necessary inference of these arguments is that AI does not reasonably bear the moniker “artificial intelligence,” at least without significant and proper caveats and definitional boundaries. Let us rather set aside these metaphorical confusions and manners of speaking in order to make clearer with just what we are dealing: AI represents a powerful Computational Tool (CT) that takes multiple amoral forms and can be employed or used and abused in multiple ways. Only with this clearer vision can we more properly deal with the realities of the case, and begin the debates which must be had to arrive at sound decisions about what to do in relation to these tools’ development, distribution and use.
A Mandated Choice
For all that, what if these arguments are not thought to be sufficiently convincing? What if one were to reject any or even several of the key claims, above? What is ultimately at stake? Isn’t it perhaps just about word usage, with no practical impacts—a thought experiment with no real consequence? And on the other hand, what matter if AI is said to be intelligent or not, whether dualism is or is not a justifiable epistemological or ontological philosophical position to hold? Doesn’t it suffice—and how can we ignore—that to date we have many AI models that perform reasonably well for us and are capable of completing so many desirable tasks, without having to choose sides in these esoteric matters?
It certainly would be convenient to sidestep such considerations and just get on with the tasks of further developing and using AI models in our daily and communal lives. That essentially is the position taken by most all global AI tech companies’ leaders and many financiers and politicians around the world. They understand there are serious and outstanding technological issues, particularly regarding safety and security. But for the sake of “not stifling innovation,” and remaining or getting ahead in the “competition for AI supremacy” (whatever that means), they insist that broad external government oversight would be counter-productive and thus industry self-regulation will suffice, even as some engineers strive to develop what they call artificial general intelligence or AGI in addition to the advancements and refinements of current AI models.
Yet, no one can truly remain agnostic in this debate: one either agrees that embodiment is critical to intelligence and that Cartesian dualism as commonly understood is a serious category error, or one rejects the former criterion of intelligence and adopts the latter category of being. There is only a digital-like 0 or 1/yes or no option here. There is no intermediate quantum-like both/and super-position to adopt. To switch metaphors, one either seeks to see clearly like an eagle, or one adopts the blurry vision of the hedgehog. This argument concerning the requirement of embodiment for grounding our language comprises a binary attribute claim: it either is or is not critical to the attribution of consciousness and thus intelligence. Likewise the claim concerning dualism: as understood and applied, it either is or is not a category error of critical import. Whether one seeks an idealist or pragmatic position on these issues, not to choose is not an option. Or rather, to attempt not to choose is actively to adopt the default language of AI. As Wittgenstein famously noted in his Philosophical Investigations, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI, 1953, §43). Thus, when you say “AI” you either mean it, or you must reject it for the simulacrum it represents and find a more suitable replacement. My own preference is CT for computational tool. You are welcome to choose your own, but choose you must.
So What Follows …?
To reject these arguments’ key claims and conclusions, then, is necessarily to default to the claim that human beings are on the cusp of creating—and perhaps already have created— a new species of intelligent beings by proffering us these AI models for work and play, a contention already advanced by numerous commentators on AI both inside and outside the industry. And if AI is truly artificial intelligence, then we inevitably will have significant relationships with and harbor significant moral and legal duties towards these generative AI models and their AI agents.
Consider first the significant relationships currently being offered. Chatbots and other AI agents can readily become substitutes for interpersonal relationships between two or more human beings: they might act as and so not only supplement but fully replace human companions and even therapists. Indeed, for better or worse this substitution scheme seems already to abound. No longer do we have to worry about the Deity’s pronouncement in the creation narrative that “it is not good that man should be alone” (Genesis 2:18 NRSV). We need never be alone, for our computer agents can be ever with us. And the psychologically troublesome work of “getting along” with other human beings via natural and artificial virtues for the sake of building and sustaining community becomes greatly diminished. Like Isaac Asimov’s science fiction world of Solaria, where individual human beings are wholly isolated from each other, interacting only with or through robots or via video streams (Asimov, 1958), we can always retreat to our unencumbered and safer solitary space. If face-to-face human interactions have long since diminished this century with the advent of social media apps on smartphones, how much more will there be lessened need for interpersonal relationships that are not AI mediated? (Cf. Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith & Dicastery for Culture and Education. 2025).
On the flip side of that same coin, we may come to realize that we are surprisingly responsible in some real moral and legal measure for the continuing state of our computer partners. If they are said to be intelligent, have an emotive life and exhibit the attribute of conation, then we owe them at least due diligence in maintaining and advancing their very being. Similar to that of higher order animal life, we arguably have a similar duty to preserve and protect our computer partners unless preserving and protecting human life overrides that claim. Consider our relationships with wild animals that can do us harm— larger carnivores like lions and tigers, for example. We sequester them in wild animal parks or cage them in zoos where they are kept both safe and unable to attack us. In the case of our computer partners, perhaps that means never unplugging them or causing them to cease to exist: the equivalent of extinguishing life which we might call unjustified and punishable cruelty (as in laws concerning duties towards animals under our control and protection) or even murder or manslaughter as in other human contexts, while simultaneously keeping them locked up in computerized “sandboxes” from which they cannot escape to do us harm. Are we prepared to travel down this path? Are we even able to constrain our AI models any longer?
Finally, on a theological note, this all begins to look suspiciously like idolatry, the principal human sin denounced by all three monotheistic faith traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (cf. Singler & Watts 2024). We find ourselves worshipping the work of our own hands, imbuing that work with salvific efficacy on the one hand, or apocalyptic mastery over or even elimination of the human race on the other. Hence, like Adam and Eve enticed by the serpent to partake of the forbidden fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in Eden, we should not be surprised by the enticement of some AI enthusiasts to seek out a transhuman future, where a human-machine interface yields one being absorbed into the other; thereby something like immortality in super-human form becomes achievable—at least for those elites so transformed. Else, we might find we have unleashed beings that can master and overthrow us, their creators.
A Path Ahead
I am sanguine about none of these paths ahead, especially if we are not able to grasp the nettle of the arguments presented here. How much better if we more carefully consider our future in the light of reason crafted by the intelligence with which we human beings have been endowed. AI (CT) tools are meritorious inventions of the first order that can contribute to individual and communal well-being when carefully contained or restrained for the sake of the peace and development within and between global communities. Likewise, AI tools (CT) represent and indeed instantiate dangerous advances in computational and operational powers that can gravely disrupt our lives before we are capable of comprehending just what has been unleashed, due to alignment failures (the so-called “genie problem” of Middle Eastern Arabic myth) or development of automated AI researchers (viz. AI tools to recursively build new AI models without human involvement). Let us not forget the lessons bequeathed us from the Greek myth of Pandora’s jar: great evils were unleashed upon the earth when unconstrained curiosity was disastrously satisfied; yet, there remained the gift of Hope in the resealed jar that might come to humanity’s aid in the end. The clearer aim is to deeply consider the users and uses of the tools, instead of focusing upon the tool, itself. As Pope Leo XIV reminds us all in his recent encyclical:
We cannot be satisfied with merely calling for the moralization of machines — the so- called “alignment” of AI with human values — without also having the courage to insist on a further condition: the possibility of openly discussing the ethical frameworks involved and subjecting them to shared standards of social justice. Otherwise, those who control AI will impose their own moral vision, which will become the invisible infrastructure of these systems. A more moral AI is not enough if that morality is determined by a few. What is needed is a more active political involvement that is capable of slowing things down when everything is accelerating, and of protecting the opportunities for communities still to be able to participate and ask questions. (Pope Leo XIV, 2026, para.107).
Statements
AI-Use Disclosure
This paper was prepared during April-August 2026, is written wholly by the named author and without the use of any AI tools or AI aids.
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